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Making a Hybrid out of a Crisis:  





This paper seeks to extend historical enquiry into hybridity and evaluate the reasons for 
creating a monopoly public service provider through a historical case study blending both 
economic and political sources of evidence. We think that this approach allows a mode of 
historical explanation which permits a dialogue with, yet circumvents, the pure abstraction of 
new economic history and encourages a multi-modal methodology (Tennent, 2020). 
Therefore, while we offer six tables of statistical information, we use this quantitative data to 
support our wider qualitative evaluation rather than presenting it as the totality of our 
analysis. Instead, we situate the creation of a new hybrid organisation as a political reaction 
to a specific crisis arising out of a combination of market failure and democratic deficit. Here, 
we build on Bratzel’s (1999) study of public transport in European cities where he observes 
that crises and social conflicts are essential ingredients in re-casting transport policy, and we 
pursue the pre-war origins of Mees’ recent (2010) proposal that public transport benefits 
from provision by arms-length organisations. We also note that resistance to changes in 
institutional logic as an organisational response hinders isomorphism and accentuates 
idiosyncrasy and the role of historical contingency (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).  
This paper begins by critiquing the existing explanation for unifying London Transport 
as being overly dependent on economic data and therefore over emphasises efficiency-
based arguments. By comparing the performance of London Transport prior to and after 
amalgamation, we show that purely economic justifications for this outcome are not entirely 
credible even in their own terms. Therefore, we supplement this quantitative data by using 
evidence from Parliamentary debates, newspapers, annual company reports and London 
Transport’s own senior managers in the period to construct an explanation that addresses 
the subjective, political aspects of amalgamation. Our next line of reasoning relates to the 
role of historical contingency in shaping the type of response to crisis. Here, we emphasise 
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the inter-war period as the frame for our investigation to encompass the statutory creation of 
London Transport as a ‘hybrid’ public service monopoly in 1933 and allow sufficient time 
either side of that event to make valid comparisons. Just as importantly, we argue this period 
also covers the major defining moment in the process of unifying London Transport, the so 
called ‘pirate bus’ crisis in 1924. In common with some other jurisdictions, this arose from the 
unregulated proliferation of private buses which caused danger, congestion, a fall in 
revenues and transport workers’ wages and a strike (Barker & Robbins, 1976; Cudahy, 
1995; Heras, 1994; Croome & Jackson, 1993; Mom, 1995). We propose that the London 
‘pirate buses’ were especially influential because they exposed both a market failure and a 
democratic deficit simultaneously. This contingency focussed a previously fissiparous 
discussion about what was positively required from transport by reversing the question and 
providing politicians and the public with a very clear example of what was definitely not 
wanted. Moreover, events in London inevitably unfolded in full view of the national press, the 
executive and the legislature, as well as taking place in a capital city whose scale dwarfed 
other regional cities and still had, in the inter-war period, pretentions to symbolising the 
orderliness expected of the centre of Empire. All these factors generated renewed urgency 
in politics to create a new body to regulate London’s transport which incorporated a new 
balance of institutional logics, supposedly tilted away from the market and towards the state 
(Gordon, 1938; Morrison, 1933; 1960).  
Our third strand of questioning relates to politics. We note that in contrast to recent 
interest in hybrid organisations from the early 1980s onwards, our study assesses hybridity 
as a supposed move away from the private sector rather than towards it. Using this novel 
approach, we examine to what degree state and market logics blended, replaced or 
assimilated into each other (Thornton et al. 2012). We argue that despite an ostensible 
commitment to civic service, the balance of these logics within the new institution remained 
skewed towards the market, excluding public transport from democratic control (Chandler, 
2007; Fowler, 2019). This uneven balance was concealed behind political rhetoric that 
propagated unification as being synonymous with rationality and efficiency, which appealed 
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to politicians in a turbulent period because it transcended the political left and right (Fowler, 
2019; Hey, 2010; Mulley 2008). In conclusion, this study shows that this form of quasi-
municipal capitalism has a long antecedence. In Britain, hybrid organisations removed the 
state from the direct provision public services decades before the (re)introduction of New 
Public Management in the 1980s (Hood, 1991). We would welcome future research 
regarding how this re-emergence was facilitated by the endurance of market institutional 
logics concealed within public services outwardly associated with state logic, as can be 
observed in this study. 
Background                
Before 1933 transport in London was provided by well over a hundred different organisations 
ranging through large scale private companies, local authorities and small independent 
operators (Barker & Robbins, 1976). London’s transportation was particularly fragmented 
because of the existence of both a London County Council and a set of London Borough 
Councils which resulted in significant overlaps and conflicts in transport provision at a 
municipal level. Some Boroughs operated rival tramways, while others banned them 
altogether. Matters were further complicated by the existence of a unique body, the 
Corporation of the City London, which held significant political influence and veto powers 
over the use of the streets in the ‘Square Mile’ of London’s commercial centre (Robson, 
1939). Finally, municipal transport was restricted legally to the operation of trams, and 
therefore all buses and trains were privately operated (Turner & Tennent, 2019).  
In this highly complex picture Yuzawa (2015) shows that only three transport organisations 
were of any city-wide significance: The Underground Electric Railway Company of London 
(UERL)1 which accounted for 66% of gross transport revenues, The Metropolitan Railway 
 
1 The UERL was a private company that had gradually acquired control of the majority of mass transit 
provision in London from 1907 onwards. Despite the title ‘Underground Electric Railway Company’ the 
UERL operated trams and buses as well as underground electric trains. 
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(MR)2 which accounted for 7% and the London County Council (LCC)3, which operated the 
largest tramway network, accounted for another 18%. We use these organisations as well as 
London based suburban railway companies as the pre-unification comparators throughout 
this study.  
In 1933 all the companies in the London transport area4 were amalgamated by 
statute into the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB). Though it was created by 
government, the Board remained in private ownership, symbolically retaining the chief 
executives of the former UERL, Lord Ashfield5 and Frank Pick6 as the new chairman and 
vice-chairman. This ‘hybrid’ mix of state and market principles, practices and symbols 
occurred in other major cities. This outcome had close parallels to the Corporacion de 
Transportes de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires in Argentina  (Heras, 1994), as well as some 
commonalities with the French Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (Garbutt, 1997) 
and the New York City Transit Authority (Cudahy, 1995). Domestically, the Board also had 
some resemblances to the contemporaneous British Broadcasting Corporation and the 
Central Electricity Board in the UK (Millward & Singleton, 1995). The statutory goals of the 
new unified organisation were set out in the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act. 
Sections 3(1) and 3(4) obliged London Transport to offer both an improving service to the 
public and ensure that fares covered all costs. These requirements offer good examples of 
the conflicting state and market logics that are the hallmark of hybrid organisations. We now 
discuss them in more detail. 
Literature  
 
2 The Metropolitan Railway was in most respects a normal railway company except that roughly a 
quarter of its network mileage ran underground through central London. It connected the prosperous 
north-western suburbs to financial centre of the City of London. 
3 The London County Council ran the most extensive and widely used tram network in the city, but 
operated no other modes of transport.  
4 A region that stretched for roughly 30 miles in all directions from central London. 
5 Albert Stanley (Lord Ashfield from 1920) grew up in America and became the assistant general 
manager of the public service corporation of New Jersey before he was recruited to the UERL as 
general manager in 1907. He became director of the UERL in 1910 and then chairman of the LPTB in 
1933 until his death in 1948. 
6 Frank Pick worked for the North Eastern Railway before moving to the UERL as an assistant to the 
managing director in 1906. He became commercial manager of the UERL in 1912, and vice chairman 
of the LPTB in 1933 until his resignation in 1940. 
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Hybrid organisations and institutional logics 
Hybrid organisations combine the functions and characteristics of private, public and 
charitable bodies. Their multi-faceted and abstruse nature has ensured that plentiful 
research has been carried out into describing and categorising them, though their 
combination of multiple organisational forms and origins make wide ranging generalisations 
difficult (Alcock, 2016; Billis, 2010; Brandsen et al. 2005; Docherty, 2014). Thus, hybrids like 
London Transport represent complex, incongruent and composite rationalities. These can be 
explored via institutional logics within different institutional orders: family, religion, state, 
market, profession and corporation (Thornton et al. 2012). Here we concern ourselves 
primarily with state and market logics. Each presents unique organising principles, practises 
and symbols which influence actors’ decisions through dominant norms, values and 
behavioural expectations which enforce legitimacy, authority and identity (Skelcher & Smith, 
2015; Thornton et al. 2012).  
The existence of these complex bodies is justified predominantly in two ways. One 
explanation offers mimetic isomorphism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983), concluding that hybrids 
emerge simply because there are other hybrids (Van Thiel, 2004). This explains an 
accelerating trend in hybrid creation since the 1980’s but does not offer much clarity about 
their antecedents. Other studies use economic data to make comparative analyses of public 
service performance before and after the creation of a new hybrid organisation as the 
service deliverer (Haigh et al. 2015). It follows that the reasons for their creation and 
existence can be objectively related to the reality of improved services or benefits stemming 
out of transaction cost advantages (Nee, 1992). However, conclusive advantages to 
customers and citizens have been hard to find in practice (Jilke et al. 2016; Overman & Van 
Thiel, 2015; Van der Walle, 2008). 
To overcome some of these explanatory problems, this paper follows other research 
looking more intensively at the historical circumstances and politics of Hybrid organisations 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Gillett & Tennent, 2018; Radford, 2013). It traces their influence 
through the balance of institutional logics evident before and after the unification of London 
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Transport as a hybrid organisation. We start with Stinchcombe’s (1965) proposition that 
distinct ‘spurts’ of rapid organisational transition which occur when the wider political 
consensus is disturbed. Disruptive historical contingencies such as democratic deficits and 
market failures act as accelerators and influencers of the timing and nature of changes in 
organisational form (Minkoff, 2002; Ruef, 2000; Sneiberg et al. 2008; Wadhwani, 2011). In 
this study we emphasise the importance of both democratic deficits and market failures in 
the creation of hybrid organisations, but we draw what we see as an important distinction 
between hybrid organisations created as social enterprises and hybrids created as semi-
independent government agencies. The former integrate the wider public into the process of 
organisational decision making (Battaliana & Lee, 2014), and the latter limit or reduce 
popular influence in service provision (Van Thiel, 2004). Through this analysis, we 
characterise London Transport as a Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation 
(QUANGO) i.e. an arms-length government agency whose purpose is to provide a social 
good normally associated with public institutions but without direct government responsibility 
or public involvement (Brandsen & Karre, 2011; Jay, 2013; Smith, 2010).  
Having established organisational form, we then employ institutional logics to tease 
out the detail of how the balance of influences changed before and after unification. 
Institutional logic has four underlying assumptions which make it useful in discussing 
hybridity in the manner adopted by this study: Firstly, it disputes the primacy of rational 
choice. It allows actors partial autonomy and seeks to explain their actions through bounded 
intentions rather than bounded rationality. Bounded intentions take into account not just 
cognitive restraints as per the limitations of rationality, but also the parameters to behaviour 
imposed by individuals’ goals and identities. These accentuate the role of political influences. 
Secondly, it allows for micro analysis at the organisational level. Thirdly, it allows the 
integration of symbolic and material evidence found in archives. Hybrid organisations fulfil 
social and economic roles and therefore leave behind both qualitative and factual evidence 
in the records they generate. We argue that interpreting that evidence requires a framework 
that accounts for both functions. Fourthly, it accepts historical contingency whilst conceding 
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that relatively little research has been done in this area (Thornton et al. 2012). In summary, 
this paper finds theories driven by mimetics or economic data to be incomplete explanations 
of both the creation and the nature of hybrid organisations. Instead, we privilege a 
historically contingent and political explanation via institutional logics, charting how a 
combination of democratic deficit and market failure gave rise to a new balance of state and 
market logics in a particular organisation. 
The unification of transport in London 
Almost all historical accounts of the unification London’s transport explain the move as a 
desire for efficiency (Barker & Robbins, 1976; Gordon, 1938; Croome & Jackson, 1993; 
Lloyd-Wilson, 1939; Morrison, 1933). In doing so they have much in common with more 
recent attempts to explain hybrids as rational choices by assessing the performance of 
public services ‘before and after’ the introduction of a hybrid monopoly. Barker, Gordon, 
Jackson’s and Morrison’s monographs and articles all draw heavily on the 1924 ‘Pirate Bus’ 
crisis to attack the market logic of competitive transport provision as wasteful. Leading 
officials from the largest pre-unified private organisations are portrayed as the foremost 
experts in their field and their succession as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the new unified 
London Transport is seen as the rightful assumption of authority (Barker & Robbins, 1976; 
Croome & Jackson, 1993; Wolmar, 2004). The literature presents the purpose of 
consolidation as financial, service and managerial efficiency. Collectively, these prospective 
benefits were referred to at the time under umbrella term ‘co-ordination’. Co-ordination of 
transport was a promise that encompassed higher dividends, better pay, faster, cheaper and 
more modern services to be delivered by a professionalised cadre of ‘scientific’ managers 
(Hey, 2010).   
Some the critics of co-ordination used efficiency in support of their arguments too. 
Porter (1907) opposed municipal or state monopoly of public services on the grounds of 
waste and moral hazard. He was concerned about excessive debts accumulated by 
irresponsible, populist policies enacted by public bodies as a result of appeasing the 
electorate. Alternatively, Morrison (1933) opposed private monopoly on the grounds of 
8 
 
excess profits, but he was confident that a state monopoly for London Transport would 
deliver the benefits implied by ‘co-ordination’ on the same efficiency-based reasoning as 
given in other literature.  
Only Lloyd-Wilson (1939) discusses the creation and operation of the new London Transport 
monopoly in terms other than efficiency. He situated the origins of the LPTB as a general 
problem of ownership exacerbated by a particular crisis, citing four factors: The crisis of 
destructive competition amongst the buses, the resulting strike, the general problem of 
congestion and the recession of the early 1920s. However, he offers little evidence and most 
of the work describes rather than critiques the mechanisms and structure of the new 
organisation.  
This leaves two gaps in the literature which this paper investigates. Firstly, the lack of 
a thorough analysis of London transport providers as businesses before and after 
amalgamation to substantiate or disprove the efficiency claims. Secondly, the political 
environment and the nature of organisational forms in transport at that time is under 
researched and under theorised, leading to an over reliance on economic data for policy 
choices. Addressing the shortfalls requires longitudinal archival research of the 
organisations, contemporary media reporting and parliamentary records combined with 
appropriate secondary literature as an analytical framework.   
 
Methods 
Following Yin’s (2003) matrix of relevant situations for different situation strategies, our study 
exists within the intersection of archival analysis, history, and case study. As inferred by our 
aforementioned research aims, we were mainly concerned with the “How?” and “Why?” of 
our case in relation to motives and decision-making. This paper seeks to review history and 
develop theory in the field of hybrid organisations. It applies a series of accountancy based 
quantitative analyses and Reay & Jones’s (2016) pattern matching qualitative analysis to 
combine the objectivity of organisation studies with historical interpretation (Buchleli & 
Wadhwani, 2014; Decker at al. 2015; Maclean et al. Decker; 2018). This is compatible with 
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Gillett and Tennent’s (2020) definition of the archive as a distinct collection of materials kept 
in an archival location, the primary evidence was drawn from archives most closely related to 
the organisation: The Transport for London corporate archive and the London Metropolitan 
archive. We supplement this with evidence from the British Newspaper archive and records 
of British parliamentary business via Hansard. We identified the secondary sources through 
the study of the relevant journals, their articles and following their citations. They allow 
triangulation of evidence of the same events between different commentators and different 
time periods.  To produce the case study, we investigated beyond descriptive case history, 
by observing patterns within the data (Pettigrew 1997), identifying motives for amalgamation 
and efficiency claims, and interaction with political and public authorities.  
In our first line of analysis, we compare London Transport’s performance before and 
after hybridisation. Here, financial data in the primary sources allows the application of a 
series of management accounting ratios to the financial records of the Metropolitan Railway 
1913-31, the Underground Electric Railway Company of London 1913-32 and the London 
Passenger Transport Board 1934-39 and 1946-47. 1933 is omitted as the amalgamation of 
the first two businesses into the latter hybrid organisation took place in June that year and 
the war years between 1939-45 are also omitted as anomalous. The annual reports for the 
Metropolitan Railway for 1920, 1925, 1929 and 1932 are missing in the archive, but we 
consider that the remaining records are sufficient to discern the trends.  
As we explained, both the specific literature concerning the creation of London 
Transport as well as much literature about hybrids in general couches its arguments in terms 
of statistical and economic data. We want to test those claims in their own terms, and we 
have selected a variety of commonly used accounting formulae and service statistics to 
make valid, reliable judgements about London Transport’s performance before and after 
hybridisation (Holmes et al. 2005; Parker, 2007; Walsh & Warner, 2015).  
 




In addition, we used qualitative records to help us examine the role of politics and the 
evolution of institutional logics. We followed Eisenhardt’s (1989) claim that linking to existing 
theory enhances the internal validity and level of theory building from case research. 
Considering public and quasi-public management theory, because our case shared cosmetic 
similarity to that described in the public–private partnership literature (e.g. Skelcher 2005).  
Consistent with Gillett and Tennent’s (2018) study of relationships between public authorities 
and private business, we identified ‘hybridity’ and ‘institutional logics’ as two applicable 
concepts, which were also compatible with one another to enhance the explanatory power of 
our research. 
The qualitative evidence covers company reports describing, explaining or justifying 
the financial results. There is a large business correspondence between the key actors, 
minutes of their meetings and memoirs published after the events and a large volume of 
evidence in newspapers and in parliamentary records of debates at the time. Through this 
we can assess changes in logics at London Transport by using elements of Reay & Jones’s 
(2016) pattern matching method to qualitatively capture institutional logics we compared our 
data against an ‘ideal’ type of institutional order shown in the diagram below (Thornton, 
2004). This is especially so where quantitative data gives unexpected or apparently 
incongruous results which benefit from historical interpretation of the events and figures in 
the discussion of the results. Lastly, we interpret our archival evidence through a typology of 
change in institutional logics to discern what new blend of logic was inherent in the newly 
created London Transport. Thornton et al. (2012) offer the following taxonomy which we use 
to frame our interpretation of the primary evidence:  
 
(Insert Tables II and III about here) 
 
The case study approach to research contains two significant weaknesses relating to 
generalisability. Firstly, that the data itself is drawn too narrowly to reliably infer trends within 
the context of the study. Here we argue that as the primary data is drawn from a 30-year 
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period, anomalies can be identified and contextualised. The second weakness is that the 
London Transport was just one example of a hybrid organisation in particular circumstances. 
We acknowledge this criticism but argue for several mitigatory factors. Firstly, that London 
was a city of global importance, especially in the period we discuss, and its sheer scale and 
influence ensures its enduring significance. Secondly, we argue that conceding some 
applicability for fidelity is an acceptable trade-off. What singular accounts give up in terms of 
generalisability they gain in terms of fidelity and contextual accuracy (Bryant, 2000). The 
case does however demonstrate the generalizability of the principles of hybridity and 
institutional logics to be equally applicable to the first half of the 20th Century, thus 
broadening the evidence base for their temporal scope.  This is important because extant 
literature focuses either mainly on the 21st century context but with some longitudinal 
element (e.g. Pache and Santos, 2013) or is based upon cases situated within the latter half 
of the 20th Century (e.g. Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Gillett and Tennent 2017; 2018; 2020; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).   
 
Findings and Discussion 
The economic data 
As our first analytical theme we asked whether the move to unified ‘hybrid’ transport provider 
could indeed be justified on economic grounds. In the period, the American ‘efficiency craze’ 
prior to the First World War suggested that amalgamation could dramatically improve 
allocative efficiency and commensurate financial performance. It was strongly associated 
with rationalising transport organisations (Miranti, 1989; Oakes & Miranti, 1996; Paish, 
1902). These improvements in financial viability and service outputs resulting from 
unification and co-ordination were also anticipated in Britain (Lowes-Dickinson, 1924). Sir 
George Gibb’s re-organisation of the North Eastern Railway owed much to his observation of 
American methods, and he became the managing director of the UERL in 1906. His protégé, 
Frank Pick, cemented the implementation of detailed statistical accounting and the general 
manager, Albert Stanley, drew on his experience of re-organisjng the Public Service 
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Corporation of New Jersey to continue the agglomeration of transport provision under UERL 
auspices after Gibb’s departure in 1910 (LT1172; LT612-002; LTM Box B6 ASH, Morrison, 
1933). Following, though not overtly acknowledging, these American leads the 1933 London 
Passenger Transport Act made it a duty of the Board to: ‘Properly co-ordinate [a] system of 
passenger transport… avoiding the provision of unnecessary and wasteful competitive 
services… to provide most efficiently and conveniently for the needs [of passengers]’. All 
these prevalent financial and operational expectations form the background to the discussion 
of the data in Tables 4-9. 
 
(Insert Table IV about here) 
 
Table Four shows that the UERL could return an average of 5-6% on their investors’ capital, 
slightly better than the Metropolitan Railway’s 4%.7 This was in line with reasonable 
expectations of the period and better than competitors such as the Big Four Railways 
(Weston, 1908; Crompton, 1985; Davies, 2014). However, the LPTB achieved a slightly 
better 6-8% return from its capital and assets.  
 
(Insert Tables V and VI about here) 
 
 
Tables Five and Six show that the short-term liquidity of the Metropolitan Railway and the 
LPTB was good for organisations with such large long term sunk costs. The Metropolitan 
Railway’s final annual report in 1933 shows that the company had made £23.3 million of 
capital expenditure (LT897-6) and by 1938 the LPTB had spent £131.3 million (LT1011-005) 
on the network. However, Warner & Walsh (2015) explain that: ‘an interesting aspect of the 
depreciation effect is that certain types of companies can suffer serious trading losses 
 
7 We acknowledge that there is some complexity here in making direct comparisons. For example, the 
Metropolitan line had a small freight and property revenue stream which the UERL did not, although 
the UERL did make money from advertising. However, all these revenue streams were minute in 
comparison to both company’s main revenue from passengers.  
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without suffering from cash shortages, e.g. transportation or utility companies. So long as 
losses are less than the depreciation charged in the accounts, their operations are cash 
positive’. Indeed, when the Second World War causes depreciation to rise rapidly the 
LPTB’s position deteriorates drastically. Nevertheless, the overall picture is that none of the 
organisations in question were seriously affected by liquidity problems in the inter-war 
period. 
 
(Insert Table VII about here) 
 
Table Seven shows that the market valued the UERL’s ordinary shares as junk. Since public 
transport systems need continual large investments for building infrastructure and renewing 
rolling stock, London’s main pre-amalgamation transport provider was therefore in long term 
difficulty. Note that their suburban and mainline competitors suffered similar dramatic 
declines. By contrast, the MR’s shares retained their value, showing that not all the 
constituent elements of the LPTB had failed the market test. This result strengthened the 
MR’s negotiating position and ensured that statutory returns to LPTB bondholders were 
higher than might reasonably be expected of a socialised industry (Barker, 1976; Croome, 
1993), an example of the enduring influence of market logics on the formation of the LPTB. 
After unification, the bonds issued by the LPTB to support its activities compare well with 
similar bond issues by city corporations that engaged with municipal trading, such as the 
provision of major tramway and bus systems. Unlike the Corporations, the LPTB was not 
able to offer the guarantee of a tax base via ratepayers to secure it preferentially low interest 
rates on its loans (Shaw, 1904).  Nevertheless, the market clearly had confidence in the 
LPTB as a viable organisation comparable in value to municipal corporations. We argue that 
this was based on an assumption that it was ‘too big to fail’, and the conservative 
establishment credentials of its Board and the appointing trustees. These factors were 
combined with their statutory immunity from the vicissitudes of democratic politics. Taken 
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together they were collectively sufficient to guarantee direct government backed loans 
(Davies, 1937, Finer, 1941). 
 
(Insert Table VIII about here) 
 
Moving to service comparisons, Table Eight presents evidence that neither the Metropolitan 
Railway nor the UERL were getting noticeably better or worse at efficiently moving 
passengers. After amalgamation, the period of control by the Board itself shows some slight 
deterioration on the railways and a plateau as regards trams, trolleys and buses. Morrison 
and others had hoped for distinct efficiencies arising out of co-ordination (Morrison, 1933). 
Table Eight shows that they were to some extent disappointed. Nevertheless, operational 
co-ordination did occur in some other areas such as the standardisation of wages and rolling 
stock. Since these meant that the highest standards of the pre-amalgamation companies 
were then applied universally across the whole of the newly unified board (Barker & 
Robbins, 1976; Clegg, 1950; Croome & Jackson, 1993), Morrison can claim to have been 
vindicated as regards the benefits of co-ordination for employees and to some extent 
passengers. The downside was that, as with other amalgamated transport companies, the 
costs of these co-ordinating moves undermined the market-based logic hopes for financial 
savings via rationalisation (Bonavia, 1981). We argue that, like efficiency, co-ordination was 
primarily a useful rhetorical device to obscure division. Where it did practically occur, there 
appears to have some slant towards state logics in its outcomes.          
 
(Insert Table IX about here) 
 
 
Regarding fares, Table Nine shows that between 1925 and 1933 the real cost of travelling a 
mile rose by 17% and thereafter it fell 9% by 1939. During the Second World War the LPTB 
raised fares by 50% in 1940 and then by 33% in 1947. However, wartime incomes also 
increased by 64%, keeping the cost of travel comparatively stable. Overall, we find that the 
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real cost of travelling rose pre-amalgamation. By contrast it remained stable or fell during the 
period of provision by a hybrid monopoly.  
In summary the quantitative data presents amalgamation in a qualified, complex, but 
broadly positive light. Over the long-term, unification ensured support from the market to sell 
debt. It also provided passengers a gradually cheaper service. Practical co-ordination was 
limited but where did occur it improved standards, albeit with commensurate costs. These 
were all gains, but we argue that overall these indices of efficiency and performance 
remained too similar and were realised too slowly for them to satisfactorily justify the 
dramatic change to hybrid monopoly provision.  
 
Historical contingency 
In our second theme, we argued for the importance of fortuity and historical context in 
understanding the nature of hybrid organisations. At Appendix One we borrow Gillett & 
Tennent’s (2020) model of evolving project organisation to show diagrammatically how these 
events coincided. As it shows, there was considerable simultaneous turbulence in politics, 
transport provision and industrial relations in the early 1920s.  
Existing literature and archival record points to an enormous growth in the number of 
private buses in London at this time. Giving evidence to Parliament, Frank Pick estimated 
that new private buses arrived on London’s streets at the rate of 20 a week, competing 
aggressively and unscrupulously for custom (Barker & Robbins, 1976; Gordon, 1938; 
Croome & Jackson, 1993). Their tactics led to the term ‘pirate buses’, practically identical to 
the Dutch phrase ‘wild buses’ which appeared concurrently to describe the same 
phenomenon of unregulated small provider chaos in Holland (Mom, 2015). The term also 
echoed the ‘railway mania’ of destructive transport competition in Britain during the 1840s 
(Morrison, 1933; Lloyd-Wilson, 1939). Concerned articles appeared in the newspapers 
(LT346-01; “Strike Prevention”, 1924), senior figures in the existing companies spoke out 
(“Pirates and Common Sense”, 1923; “The Pirate Bus”, 1923; Lord Ashfield Cross-
Examined”, 1924) and questions were raised in Parliament (Gordon, 1938, Jackson, 1962; 
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Barker, 1974). By late 1923 existing market logic consensus regarding fares, rational service 
provision, congestion, safety and fair wages had lost credibility. Unrestrained competition 
had led to market failure. Then on the 21st March 1924 the situation deteriorated further 
when tram and bus workers struck.  
The dispute arose out of a proposed reduction in wages for tramway workers on the 
London and Suburban Traction Company,8 caused by loss of traffic to buses. The Transport 
and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) met the cut by a counter claim for a rise which 
management rejected, and the strike began (Clegg, 1950). The underground railway workers 
promised to join them, threatening a complete shutdown of transport provision (Eady, 2016). 
As the crisis escalated it was clear that the London County Council, the only democratic 
institution that represented the London public’s interest in the provision of public transport, 
was wedded to market control and had little interest or leverage in events.9 A market failure 
and a democratic deficit coincided.   
We argue that this was the decisive moment in the drive to unification. In response to 
the crises caused by the pirate buses central government took rapid and drastic action. Just 
four days after the start of the strike the London Traffic Act received its first reading 
(Hansard, 16th and 24th June 1924). The Act dramatically restricted the number of streets 
that new companies could use. Thereafter number of buses run by small operators peaked 
at 550 in 1925 and then declined rapidly as the existing companies bought them out (Barker 
& Robbins, 1976). This transition from disorderly competition to regulated provision is also 
observable in the same period in Buenos Aires (Heras, 1994) and Santiago (Figueroa, 2013) 
as well as being replicated more recently in Bogota (Bocarejo et al., 2013).  
 
8 The holding company through which all of the UERL’s trams were operated. 
9 Since 1907 the LCC had been controlled by the Municipal Reform Party. The Party was a 
Conservative affiliated Party whose natural constituency was ratepayers and small businesses. It 
opposed the use of property rates to fund the provision of public services such as tramways. For more 
detail see Offer, A (1981) Property and Politics, Masterman, C. (1909) The Condition of England and 
Turner & Tennent, (2019) ‘Progressive strategies of municipal trading: The policies of the London 




This rapid and effective response needs to be contrasted with decades long debate that had 
already occurred between advocates and market and state logic in the provision of public 
transport (Morrison, 1933). The arguments had already been debated in parliament 
(Hansard, 17th March 1919) and clashes on this topic between rival lobbyists had also 
occurred during the Kennedy-Jones investigation into the governance of London transport in 
1920 (Morrison, 1933; MT33/200; MT33/246). However, the Kennedy-Jones proposals for a 
unified body to run London transport were stymied over disagreement about the practicalities 
of unifying London’s disparate local authorities. The proposal ran out of parliamentary time 
(Hansard, 15th November 1920).  
The 1924 crisis ended the deadlock. Not only did it bring about a rapid escalation in 
the intensity of lobbying, it also re-configured the balance between the lobbyists in terms of 
the evidence that they were able to deploy and the terms in which they were able to present 
it (Stigler, 1971). The Kennedy-Jones proposals for a unified, state backed transport provider 
had been fought out in a relatively private manner between the lobbyists and had attracted 
little attention outside parliament. The turmoil caused by pirate buses meant that lobbying 
schemes now took place in the public eye and with a sense of urgency that had not been 
present previously (“Absolute Chaos”, 1923; “Complete Stoppage of Trams and Buses”, 
1924; Hansard, 25th February 1924). The urgency and proximity of the crises to central 
government created a consensus combining interests from left and right of the political 
spectrum in favour of unification. Existing transport business interests allied with large trade 
unions such as the TGWU to press for unified control to protect profits and wages. 
Opposition came from the Liberal Party and parts of the Labour Party who favoured 
municipal management (Hansard, 16th June 1924). Their resistance failed because it was 
undermined on key issues. Their preferred public controlling body, the LCC, was run by the 
Municipal Reform Party whose primary objective was to relinquish rather than aggregate 
control. Secondly, the majority of the Labour Party preferred to act in accordance with the 
wishes of the TGWU in controlling competition and creating a consolidated transport 
provider (Donoghue, 1973; Hansard, 25th February, 1924).  
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The 1924 Act was therefore followed by a succession on Bills from 1927 onwards to 
create a hybrid monopoly provider exhibiting both state and market logics in its governing 
principles and practices (Hansard, 23rd April 1928; 19th February and 1st May 1929). Several 
changes of government caused delays until 1933. However, with minor cosmetic changes to 
the original 1927 proposals, they were adopted in that year (Donoghue, 1973; Hansard, 6th 
October 1931). The creation of a unified London Transport organisation was the product of a 
dominant consensus that spanned both left and right. The ability to apparently resolve 
contradictory institutional logics in a complimentary way was and is one of the great 
attractions of a ‘hybrid’ solution to a crisis (Busco et al, 2017). The question remained what 
balance of logics the new unified organisation represented. 
 
Institutional logics            
In this section we discuss another ‘before and after’ comparison between the principal 
transport providers that existed prior to amalgamation and the subsequent single unified 
organisation. We look at the evidence of key principles, practices, symbols and assess if 
they exist in the forms described in Thornton et al’s table of ideal institutional logic types and 
characteristics. We then ask what form of change occurred, and how and why it manifested 
itself in that way.  
Prior to the creation of a single hybrid provider, the three key organisations that 
provided the overwhelming majority of London’s transport prior to unification were the 
Metropolitan Railway, The Underground Electric Railway Company of London and the 
London County Council. The first two were private companies, the latter a municipally 
controlled organisation. However, by 1933 both of the private companies were already to 
some degree constrained and supported by the state. During the First World War the 
Metropolitan Railway had been brough under state control. Though the UERL was not, it had 
ceased issuing private share capital and instead raised its investment income through state 
backed bonds (Barker & Robbins, 1976; Fowler, 2019). The market logic of shareholder 
activism was diminished, but not entirely extirpated. In terms of revenue, the fares that 
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railway companies could charge had been controlled by central government in some 
respects since the late 19th century. After 1921 companies had to apply to the railway rates 
tribunal if they wished to alter their fares. The tribunal viewed railways as a common social 
carrier, duty bound to carry all traffic (Gourvish, 1980). In Thornton et al’s (2012) schema, 
this development led the metaphor of transaction towards redistribution, and the basis of 
strategy shifted from away from pure profit. We can see that two of the three major 
component parts of the new unified London Transport had already acquired some distinctly 
state-like logics to their activities and intentions, though this was much more true of the 
UERL than the Metropolitan Railway.  
The third individually significant segment of London’s transport system were the 
trams operated by the LCC. As their council minutes and reports show, this organisation 
conceived of itself as a public service provider with social as well as financial objectives and 
was subject to the strictures of democratic oversight rather than shareholders’ meetings 
(LMA927 to 959 series; Turner & Tennent, 2019). In terms of state logics, its policies 
towards its employees were openly redistributive, it sought the community good through 
control of its fares, especially for economically marginalised groups such as workmen, and it 
derived its legitimacy through regular democratic participation in both elections and its 
committee structure (Finer, 1941).  
Finally, we also consider the ninety-two smaller undertakings that were amalgamated 
in 1933. Of these fourteen were Borough Council tramway systems, similar to the LCC but of 
a much smaller size. By contrast, fifty-five were small bus companies employing fewer than 
thirty people (LT1011-01 and LT1011-02 LPTB Annual Reports; Barker & Robbins, 1976). 
We conclude that in 1933 London Transport absorbed a full spectrum of state and market 
logics. These were implicit in the range of organisations as small as just five people 
operating in conditions approximating perfect competition and responding to consumer 
demand, through to a huge municipality intent on socialising the costs of its service and 
accountable to it its citizens through the ballot box.     
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It is therefore understandable that London Transport’s founding statute contains 
significant ambiguity in its principles. As Robson (1937) comments: ‘These boards [like the 
LPTB] grew up in typically British fashion. They were not based on any clearly defined 
principle; they evolved in a haphazard and empirical manner.’  Therefore, at section 3(1) 
London Transport was supposed to: ‘Secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-
ordinated system of passenger transport… [and] extend and improve the facilities’, while at 
section 3(4) it was also supposed to: ‘Conduct [the] undertaking in such manner, and to fix 
such fares and charges as to secure that their revenues shall be sufficient to defray all 
charges.’ This wording indicates a balance between profit and community good as the basis 
for the organisation’s strategy and suggests an equal blending of state and market logics in 
the typology of change in field-level institutional logic. 
However, we now argue that the remainder of the statute and the actual practices of 
the organisation show a distinct tilt towards market logic. We suggest that change in 
London’s transport logics was more developmental than transformational. Hybridisation 
allowed the assimilation of some of the outward dimensions of state logic, but only at the 
level of the principles of the organisation and not conclusively. At the level of practices and 
symbols, the market order remained dominant. There was little or no progress at all towards 
democratic participation and passengers remained consumers rather than citizens. The 
statute unified London Transport as an organisation emphasising the insularity of the Board 
of Directors from democratic control. Section 1(1) and (4) shows that they were selected to 
serve for up to seven years by a group of five trustees. The majority of the trustees were not 
subject to public scrutiny.  
Two of them were drawn from financial professions, one from a legal background and 
two from local government. Furthermore, in terms of actual practice the Board’s composition 
and expertise was additionally weighted towards the market. By far the most influential 
figures on the Board were the chairman and vice-chairman who were both drawn from the 
privately owned UERL. Collectively they served for 21 years. Alongside the chairman, the 
only other members who served for the entire 14-year duration of the Board’s existence 
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were a director of the Bank of England and the secretary of the TGWU. The three remaining 
posts shuttled between a succession nine senior local government figures who were 
democratically accountable, but three of whom served for no more than a year (LT-1011 
series). In practice, the Chairman and Vice-chairman were the only members with industry 
experience and therefore found it easy to control debate (Finer, 1941; LT-1172-13), nor were 
the public representatives eager to press their claims.  
At section 30(1) the act allowed local authorities the power petition London Transport 
about services and fares. In theory, a committee met up to four times a year to discuss 
points raised via public bodies but by 1939 it had met on just three occasions, drawing 
critical comments from MPs (Fowler, 2019). Instead, London Transport interacted with the 
public through carefully monitoring the press and its postbag. Archives show that a selection 
of news items was prepared weekly for the Vice chairman. Responding to one particular 
aspect of service provision in 1937-38, the vice-chairman wrote direct personal replies to 
critical letters, all of which appeared as a rolling correspondence in The Times newspaper 
(Croome & Jackson, 1993). During the 1937 bus strike the number of individual letters 
supporting, criticising and remaining neutral on the issue were counted on a daily basis and 
reported directly to the chairman. Remarkably, he found the time to make a number of 
personal replies, which, in a deferential society, gratified their recipients (LT-493-051-002) 
and helped to foster Lord Ashfield’s reputation for having ‘the common touch’ (LT42-023). 
Actual policy changes were rare, though small technical adjustments, such as to individual 
fares, did occur (Croome & Jackson, 1993). The archives show us that there was no 
effective way for passengers to affect wider policy at London Transport through civic 
structures, yet if they expressed a view in the form of a customer complaint it at least merited 
a response, and occasionally action. We take this as being indicative of market orientated 
organisation willing to engage with users as consumers but not as citizens.  
The emasculation of local government and passengers as a result of de jure and de 
facto market logics left London Transport’s bondholders and Trade Union power as two 
other potential restraints on the Board’s autonomy. Sections 39 (1) and (14) of the Act show 
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that London Transport could autonomously raise capital by bond issues and that should it fail 
to satisfy the requirements of the bondholders they were empowered to call in receivers. 
These mechanisms were aligned to market norms of shareholder activism and measures of 
the organisation’s status in the market as expressed through share price and financial 
analysts’ forecasts. Here, clear principles and symbols of market logic were tempered in 
practice. London Transport did raise significant volumes capital by floating bond issues, but 
only with state guarantees. London Transport cast itself as a commercial organisation 
responding to the need for profits and the opinions of industry analysts, but it could not 
ignore its relationship with central government. However, the relationship with the state was 
only sporadic. This was a market logic legacy, we argue, of the traditional antipathy to 
continual subventions to public services from ratepayers (Porter, 1907). Therefore, the 
Board approached the state only twice, once in 1935 for the approval of large investment 
programme and once again in 1939 to request an increase in fares. The money raised was 
strictly on the basis of a capital investment programme rather than underwriting daily 
operational costs, and there was no continuous annual subsidy.        
By contrast, London Transport had frequent contact with the major Trade Unions (LT-
493-080). Note that one of three members of the Board to hold their seat continuously was 
the Trade Union member, and that the 1933 Act gives a clear mechanism by which 
employee negotiations could be conducted at Sections 68 and 69. Unlike the local authority 
and passenger mechanisms, it operated regularly (Clegg, 1950, Eady, 2016). The close 
integration of Trade Unions into the fabric of London Transport’s structures and decision-
making processes would seem to make an argument for the influence of state related 
institutional logic related to the integration of communities and interest groups into 
organisational practices outside the narrow sense of market transactions. However, we 
argue that this misunderstands the nature of British Trade Unionism. Although Trade Unions 
often invoked statist symbols like nationalisation, they always resisted integration into the 
state and successfully fought to retain free collective bargaining as independent 
organisations (Egerton, 2018; Greaves, 2005; Marquand, 2008; Middlemas, 1979; Millward 
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& Singleton, 1995). Thus John Cliff, the TGWU London Transport Board Member, should be 
understood as a representative of labour as an interest group in the context of competitive 
marketplace. This tendency for Trade Unions to see themselves as organisations which 
bargained for the best deal for their members borrowed heavily from market logics. The 
sense of employment as an openly negotiable and individualised transaction was reinforced 
in London Transport by professional demarcation and the threat of small breakaway Unions 
offering better terms for their members than parent organisations, such as the National 
Passenger Workers Union, and the continual refusal of many road transport staff to join a 
Union at all (LT-493-047).    
Therefore, we propose that London Transport was a carefully constructed balance of 
institutional logics. Outwardly, it assimilated some features of state logic as principles 
enshrined in statute, but these were more than balanced by clear obligations to market 
logics, sometimes concomitantly. In the realm of practice, and in some important symbolic 
ways such as the choice of the Chairman, market logic was cleaved to. This construction 
gave a nominal commitment to state logic at a time considerable social and industrial unrest 
whilst preserving the essential features of the market (Murray, 2010). 
 
Conclusions 
We explain the creation of a unified, hybrid, provider of London’s transport via a particular 
crisis of market competition and democratic accountability which the national government, 
municipal government and London’s transport providers were obliged to respond to in 1924. 
Furthermore, we argue that the political volatility of this period explicates the need to 
obscure both the true nature of the confrontation between state and market logics and the 
hidden endurance of market logic in an outwardly public organisation. The LPTB retained 
many capitalist characteristics and was the first Board to be created that was modelled on 
the capitalist public company with financial autonomy with no democratic responsibility 
(Davies, 1937). Hence the prominence of ‘efficiency’ as a mutually acceptable, though 
unproven, rhetoric around which adherents of both the state and the market could coalesce. 
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We cast doubt on arguments based on economic data as sufficient justification for hybridity 
and in doing so, make a historical contribution through its use of archival material to 
challenge extant historical narratives in standard texts (Tennent, 2020).  
Looking forward, we suggest that while this is a relatively specialised paper dealing 
with a single organisation, there may be a much more expansive area for future research 
agenda in the development of hybrid municipal bodies combining elements of municipal 
capitalism and municipal socialism (Tennent et al. 2020). Much research in hybridity 
assumes that hybrid organisations emerged in the 1980s. The minor theoretical contribution 
of this paper is to show they appeared far earlier. Expanding on this agenda in the context of 
the UK, we tentatively argue for a long hibernation of market logics in public services which 
ended in the early 1980s when they were able to re-emerge, re-invigorated and with the 
benefit of long, hidden antecedence. If, as Mees (2010) suggests, the future of transport 
provision is best given to ‘Hybrid’ organisations, then future research should continue to 
improve wider understanding of hybridisation by drawing connections between the creation 
of hybrid organisations and the specific disturbances to historical consensuses over 
ownership and control surrounding their formation. In Britain, and potentially throughout the 
‘Anglosphere’, exploring the origins of the contested shift towards redistribution via state or 
municipal action can offer a more extensive understanding of municipal trading and the 
source of the conflicted expectations that nationalised industries should offer both a social 
service and yet also ‘pay their way’ in later decades.  
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Date   London Transport’s     Governments        Industrial Relations   London Transport Acts, 
Organisational Form                       in Transport   Reports and Bills 
 
1913             Liberal  
1914 
1915       Lib/Con Coalition 
1916      
1917 
1918       Con/Lib Coalition 
1919         Strike           Kennedy-Jones Report Rejected 
1920 
1921   Multiple Private                               Ullswater Report Rejected 
1922            and Municipal Providers              Conservative 
1923                                 Labour    Strike               
1924       Conservative      London Traffic Act Passed 
1925 
1926         Strike 
1927                  London Passenger Bill Proposed  
1928           
1929               Labour                         London Passenger Bill Rejected 
1930                   London Passenger Bill Revised 
1931      Conservative Coalition  
1932                        London Passenger Bill - Minor Revisions 
1933            Transition Year                                    London Passenger Transport Act Passed 
1934  Single Hybrid Provider 
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